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Do Tax Incentives for Investment Work?
by Murray L. Weidenbaum
A mythology has developed concerning tax
incentives for business investment. The litany
of charges has become predictable-investment incentives don't work; despite the array of
incentives, capital spending and employment
have been stagnant; companies have merely
used the "tax breaks" to cut their tax bills; in
fact, the big users of these tax provisions don't
pay any taxes at all. We hear these charges so
frequently that they are close to becoming
adopted as gospel.
This report analyzes each of those charges
and shows-to the contrary-that tax incentives have provided substantial benefits to the
American economy and that the critics have
underestimated the tax payments of many
American companies.
Charge #1. "Corporate capital spending has
been virtually stagnant since the tax breaks
were enacted." 1
Stagnation is not the description that comes
to mind for a rise in such spending from $395
billion in 1981 to $4 72 billion in 1985 (in constant 1982 dollars). The reality is that, following
the 1981-82 recession, the private sector's capital spending has paced the current recovery in
the American economy. In its January 1986
These and the criticisms that follow are taken
from Money for Nothing: The Failure of Corporate Tax
Incentives 1981-84 (Washington, D.C.: Citizens for Tax
Justice, February 1986).
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Murray L. Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for
the Study of American Business and Mallinckrodt
Distinguished University Professor at Washington
University in St. Louis. This report draws on his
study, Tax Incentives for Investment: A Positive
Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Coalition for Jobs,
Growth and International Competitiveness, May
1986).
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Figure 1
TREND OF REAL NONRESIDENTIAL
FIXED INVESTMENT

annual report, the Council of Economic
Advisers described the current situation
clearly:
The sector that has uniformly outperformed
average historical experience is gross private
domestic investment .... above-average growth
was recorded for all major categories of private
domestic fixed investment and was particularly
prominent for real nonresidential fixed
investment.

The CEA's somewhat forbidding term, "nonresidential fixed investment," is how economists
refer to business capital spending. From the
recession trough through the end of 1985, real
nonresidential fixed investment rose 11.3 percent a year. That rate is almost double the 6.4
percent growth registered in the average expansion since World War II. The growth of real
nonresidential fixed investment in the current
recovery has been twice that of personal consumption or real GNP. That is hardly a pattern
of stagnation on the part of corporate capital
spending. Figure 1 shows very clearly the
upward trend in business investment.
Charge #2. "Corporate Tax Breaks Have
Failed to Spur Investment ... "
One of the fundamental fallacies that is
exposed early in any beginning economics
course is "post hoc ergo propter hoc." In plain
English, that says avoid jumping to the conclusion that, just because one event followed
another event, the first event must have caused
the second. On reflection, that is fairly obvious.
All sorts of other factors could have caused the
second event. A "before and after" analysis is
just too simpleminded.
Thus, in measuring the impact of tax policy
changes made in 1981, the professionally correct way is not just to look at the next year or
two. That procedure ignores the recession in
1981 and 1982. Of course, few companies
embarked on a rapid expansion in capital
investment during the depths of the recession
and their failure to do so is no reflection on the
effectiveness of the 1981 tax changes.
Professors of economics-of all political
persuasions-explain to their students that the
2
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correct method for evaluating the impact of a
change in policy is the "with or without"
analysis. That is, what would have happened if
that first event did not occur? This more comprehensive approach requires taking into
account all relevant factors, including changes
in tax policy as well as interest rates, sales, earnings, capacity utilization, prices, and foreign
competition.
There is no need to guess about the results
from doing a "with or without analysis" of the
impact of the 1981 tax incentives on business
investment. Serious studies have been made by
several outstanding ecnomists. Michael J.
Baskin, professor of economics at Stanford
University, performed such an analysis in 1985.
He reached the following conclusions with
reference to the 1981 and 1982 tax laws that
established the system of liberalized depreciation known as the Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (ACRS) and made changes in the investment tax credit (lTC):
Using alternative methodologies, various
definitions of the variables, employing sensitivity analyses, and comparing our results to
those of most other studies, we conclude that the
incentive effects of ACRS and the extended lTC
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very likely contributed substantially to net
investment in the United States in the 1982-84
period. Our estimates hover around 20% of net
investment being directly attributable to the
changes in the investment incentives. 2

Baskin's overall conclusion that the tax incentives contribute "around 20 percent of net
investment" demolishes the critics. After
presenting and examining detailed statistical
and econometric analyses from a great variety
of sources, the Baskin report concludes, "We
believe the preponderance of the evidence suggests that the investment incentives worked, in
the sense that they stimulated investment
substantially."

"The preponderance of the evidence suggests
that investment incentives worked ... they
stimulated investment substantially."
Baskin has lots of distinguished company in
arriving at that conclusion. For example, Dr.
John Makin of the American Enterprise
Institute and Dr. Raymond Sauer of the University of New Mexico show that the investment
incentives enacted in 1981 strengthened the
investment expansion underway in 1983 and
1984.
Dr. Allen Sinai, chief economist of Shearson
Lehman Brothers, and his associates reach
similar conclusions, demonstrating how the
investment incentives are far more costeffective than the alternative of rate reductions.
They also go on to show that removing such
targeted incentives as lTC and ACRS-and even
substituting some reductions of corporate profits taxes-"should reduce output, lower
business equipment and plant outlays, lessen
the associated borrowing, depress employment,
reduce wages, and cut after-tax corporate profits in the most capital-intensive sectors and
2

Michael J. Boskin, The Impact of the 1981-82
Investment Incentives on Business Fixed Investment
(Washington, D.C.: National Chamber Foundation,
1985).
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industries of the U.S. economy:'
Martin Feldstein of Harvard University, in a
recent working paper issued by the National
Bureau of Economic Research, reaches similar
conclusions. He shows, for example, that enactment of the House of Representatives tax
reform bill would reduce the investment-toGNP ratio by about half of its increase from the
1979-81 level.
Three of my colleagues at Washington
University-Laurence Meyer, Joel Prakken, and
Chris Varvares-have estimated the detailed
effects of eliminating the investment tax credit
and cutting back on accelerated depreciation
(as the House of Representatives voted to do in
the tax reform bill it passed in December 1985).
Such action would, by 1991, lower the gross
national product by 2.2 percent and raise
unemployment by 1.1 million, compared with
the growth and employment that would be
expected under the current law.
Charge #3. The "striking failure of tax
'incentives' to produce more ... jobs .... "
Some observers complain about the supposed lack of new jobs that were expected to
accompany the rise in capital spending following the enactment of the 1981 tax incentives. But
the employment resulting from new capital
investment is extensive. It is not just a matter of
examining the employment figures for the company (Corporation A) that makes the capital
investment. We must also take account of the
jobs created in the firms building the new factories (Corporations Band C) and producing the
new equipment (Corporations D, E, and F)-and
then we also should examine the employment
in the manufacturing and service companies (G,
H, I, J, K, etc.) that use the products that Corporation A makes.
We can obtain a good first approximation of
this complete process from overall data on
employment in the United States. The results
are extremely positive. In fact, they are the envy
of the rest of the world; employment in Western
Europe has been stagnant in recent years while
job creation in the United States has been
robust.
5

Since 1981, 8.5 million new jobs have been
created in this country, with total civilian
employment in the private sector rising from
100.4 million in 1981 to 108.9 million in April
1986 (see Table 1). So much for the allegation of
"striking failure" to create new jobs.
The experience of the General Electric Company provides a good example of the effectiveness of tax incentives for corpotate investment.
From the time that the Economic Recovery Tax
Act went into effect in 1981 until the end of 1985,
General Electric and its finance subsidiaries
invested $22 billion in its own plants and in
other U.S. factories, utilities, airlines, and
railroads. The company estimates that these
investments created or preserved at least
250,000 jobs. Moreover, the investments helped
to make the company more competitive and to
achieve a $2.6 billion trade surplus in 1985, a
year when the United States suffered a merchandise trade deficit of $150 billion.
Charge #4. Capital-intensive companies
"... paid little or nothing in federal income taxes
over the 1981-84 period."
The activist organization known as Citizens
for Tax Justice has circulated a list of 44large
companies that supposedly paid no federal
income taxes over the period 1981-84. Indeed, as
a group, the 44 companies are alleged to have
received refunds of $2.1 billion from the U.S.
Treasury. What is the truth of the matter?

Table 1
EMPLOYMENT TRENDS, 1981-1986
(in millions)

}
Jr

Cumulative
Change

Year

Civilian
Employment

1981

100.4

1982

99.5

-0.9

1983

100.8

+0.4

1984

105.0

+4.6

1985

107.2

+6.8

April 1986

108.9

+8.5

Source: U.S. Department of Labor

Upon inspection, it turns out that the critics
omit a major share of the corporate tax
liabilities of these companies for 1981-84 and
ignore virtually all of their tax payments during
that period.
For example, they purposely omit the entire
category of deferred taxes, which many
accounting authorities would seriously question. Taking advantage of such ignorance,
critics of providing investment incentives for

businesses underestimate the true size of corporate tax burdens in the United States.
Even if, for the sake of argument, we omit all
deferred taxes from the calculations, we do not
come up with anything like the CTJ charge that
the 44 companies paid no federal income taxes
at all. Thus, even arbitrarily leaving out the
entire category of defer·red taxes, we find that
these same companies actually paid over $1.3
billion in current Federal taxes for 1981-84. The
data in Table 2 compare the authoritative
numbers of Standard and Poor's Compustat
Services with the CTJ estimates.
A major factor in explaining the large
discrepancy between Federal taxes paid and the
CTJ figures is CTJ's erroneous "adjustments"
for safe harbor leasing. Safe harbor leasing is
the term applied to selling of unusable tax
benefits related to investments in new equipment. (The tax benefits were unusable because
the firms had insufficient taxable income to offset against them.) Most of this activity occurred
after the enactment of the Economic Recovery

6
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Critics of providing investment incentives for
businesses underestimate the true size of
corporate tax burdens in the United States.

Table 2
CURRENT FEDERAL TAXES PAID BY
U.S. CORPORATIONS
Comparison of Compustat Data and CTJ
Estimates, 1981-84
(in millions)
Company
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
I2.
I3.
I4.
IS.
I6.
I7.
I8.
I9.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

ITT
Dow
Ashland
Tesoro
Piedmont
Boeing
Int.Min&Chem
Northrup
IC Industries
Sun Chemical
Mitchell Energy
Pepsico
Georgia-Pacific
Int. Multifoods
General
Dynamics
Weyerhaeuser
Harris
Singer
Santa
Fe/Southern
Pacific
Scott Paper
Tenneco
Centex
Southwest Air
Texaco
Union Carbide
Inti. Paper
Greyhound
Allied/Signal
Panhandle
Eastern
Ogden
Ohio Edison
Northern
Indiana PSC
Philadelphia
Elec.
Tysons Foods
Columbia Gas
Jim Walter
Arizona PSC
General
Electric

Compustat
CTJ
Data
Estimates Difference
$3I5.7'
(180.0)
(62.0)
(22.4)
O.I
(I3.7)
2.3
(46.4)
Il.3
(10.4)
(23.7)
482.6
(I8.0)
(3.2)

($I77.7)
(180.0)
(62.0)
(22.5)
(25.4)
(285.0)
(43.7)
(46.4)
(55.4)
(I0.4)
(41.1)
(I35.8)
(59.0)
(3.2)

$493.4
0.0
0.0
0.1
22 .5
271.3
46.0
0.0
66.7
0.0
I7.4
6I8.4
41.0
0.0

NR

(103.8)
(59.1)
(19.5)
(11.6)

I03.8
116.4
I5.6
I2.5

I74.5
108.4
(227.0)
(10.3)
3.0
(68.0)
36.0
5.3
67.4
IJ.Ob

(133.4)
(30.5)
(166.0)
(10.2)
(8.1)
(68.0)
(32.6)
(10.4)
(I7.0)

307.9
138.9
(61.0)
(0.1)
11.1
0.0
62.0
37.9
77.8
28.0

(63.7)
21.8<
252.7

(28.8)
(5.6)
(3I.8)

(34.9)
27.4
284.5

(I4.6)

(I4.6)

(0.0)

299.0
20.9
(I2.9)
(7 .8)
35.4

(30.3)
(1.0)
(IS.9)
(4.1)
(I4.1)

329.3
21.9
3.0
(3.7)
49.5

$(I30.0)

$(98.0)

$(32.0)

57.3
(3.9)
0.9

8

(26.0)

Table 2 (continued)
CURRENT FEDERAL TAXES PAID BY
U.S. CORPORATIONS
Comparison of Compustat Data and CTJ
Estimates, 1981-84
(in millions)
Company

Compustat
CTJ
Data
Estimates Difference
(40.0)
158.7

(40.0)
(9.2)

0.0
I67.9

177.7

(10.0)

I87.7

48.8'
0.0
0.0

(1.1)
0.0
0.0

49.9
0.0
0.0

$I,332.8

(2,I48.3)

39. Dupont
40. Xerox
41. Pennsylvania
P&L
42. Burlington
Northern
43. Grumman
44. Lockheed

$3,481.1

•Excludes 1984
bExcludes 1983-84
<1984 only
NR = Not reported

Tax Act of 1981 and before the repeal of safe
harbor leasing by the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982.
In essence, safe harbor leasing allowed certain companies which invested in new equipment to realize the present value of the related
tax benefits by selling them to another, more
profitable company, which would then be
entitled to claim the tax benefits on its own tax
return. Obviously, only one party to this
transaction-namely the buyer-realizes a
reduction in its tax liability. The seller receives
some value for this, but it does not represent a
reduction in its tax liability.
Unfortunately, CTJ failed to understand the
nature of these transactions and ended up
double counting the tax benefits related to
them. CTJ counted both the buyer and the seller
as realizing the tax benefits from safe harbor
leasing.
To put the matter simply but accurately, if any
of the companies had made adjustments in
their reports to the SEC or the IRS similar to the
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ones made in the CT J report, CTJ would probably have lambasted them for "cooking the
books:·

If any of the companies criticized by Citizens
for Tax Justice had made adjustments in their
financial reports similar to the ones made in
the CTJ report, CTJ would probably have
lambasted them for ''cooking the books."
An inspection of Table 2 is quite enlightening.
Pepsico, for example, is estimated by CTJ to
have paid no federal income taxes in 1981-84 and
supposedly having received net refunds of
$135.8 million. But according to the Com pus tat
data, the company paid almost $482.6 million in
federal income taxes during that period. Ohio
Edison, supposedly a recipient of $31.8 million
in refunds, actually paid $252.7 million in
federal income tax over the period.

t

Some critics seem preoccupied with tax
incentives to business, especially in the area of
capital formation. Totally ignored is the host of
government expenditures and credit subsidies
to promote capital formation and other
business purposes-the many billions of
dollars that have been spent for these purposes
in recent years by the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of
Reclamation, the Small Business Administration and by other activities of the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, Interior,
and Transportation.

The attack on tax incentives, in good measure,
is an assault on the role and importance of the
private sector in the American economy and
on the location of economic decisionmaking.

The critics ignore the fact that the investment
tax credit and ACRS are only second-best
substitutes for dealing with the severe
economic shortcomings of conventional tax
accounting and for the bias in the tax system
against saving and investment. It is well known
that the existing tax system ignores the inroads
of inflation on capital assets as well as on corporate earnings. But none of the presently considered tax reform measures would replace the
archaic historical-cost basis of accounting now
in use with economic or replacement cost
accounting.

Perhaps the preoccupation arises because of
the fundamental but ignored distinction
between general-purpose tax incentives and
closely targeted expenditure subsidies for
capital formation. Under the tax approach, the
individual business firm takes the initiative in
selecting an investment project and it incurs the
bulk of the risk involved. Under the government
expenditure approach, in striking contrast, a
federal agency determines which specific
capital projects are to be financed and the
government winds up bearing all or most of the
risk.
Thus, the attack on tax incentives involves
more serious questions than appear on the surface. In good measure, it is an assault on the role
and importance of the private sector in the
American economy and on the location of
economic decisionmaking. A reduction in tax
incentives and an increase in expenditure subsidies would result in an expansion of the direct
role of the federal government in choosing
capital investments-and a reduction of private
risk-bearing.
Regardless of whether there is a hidden
agenda behind the tax analyses published by

10
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A few of the mistakes in the often-quoted CTJ
data go the other way. For example, Tenneco
received refunds (or credits) of $227 million
rather than $166 million and Panhandle Eastern
$63.7 million instead of $28.8 million. But, in the
aggregate, the CTJ "adjustments" missed over
$3 billion of federal corporate income taxes
paid during 1981-84.

Some Final Thoughts

the Citizens for Tax Justice, the fact remains
that their figures are simply wrong. Basing tax
policy on such flawed information would be a
serious mistake and would lead to tax laws that
discourage economic growth and ultimately
penalize both workers and consumers.

12

t

